Essay
What Status Anxiety Is, and What Actually Feeds It
Status anxiety is the worry about where you stand in other people’s eyes. Alain de Botton gave the feeling its name in a 2004 book and defined it without decoration: “an anxiety about what others think of us; about whether we’re judged a success or a failure, a winner or a loser” (de Botton 2004). He is careful to say it is not vanity. People care about rank because rank changes how they are treated. Most people, as he puts it, are nice to us according to the amount of status we have.
That makes status anxiety a rational response to a real arrangement, which is why it does not yield to being told to stop caring. If you want less of it, you have to change the arrangement. This essay is about what the evidence says the arrangement actually does to people, where that evidence is strong, where it is contested, and what changes if honour is plural rather than singular.
Standing is judged locally, long before it is judged nationally
Robert Frank made the observation that most of the later work rests on. In Choosing the Right Pond (Frank 1985) he argued that people evaluate themselves against the people immediately around them, not against the whole distribution. The painful question is whether to be a big frog in a small pond or a small frog in a big one.
This has a consequence that gets skipped. If standing is judged locally, the number of ponds a society runs is a design variable, not a fact of nature. We have argued the positional-goods half of this case in Status Is the Scarce Thing and will not repeat it here. What we want to add is the part that the health literature has been quietly testing for thirty years: what a ladder does to the body of the person standing on it.
Rank alone is not the toxin
The popular version of the biology is simple. Low rank means chronic stress, chronic stress means worse health, so hierarchy is bad for you. Robert Sapolsky, whose baboon fieldwork is the most cited source for that story, has spent much of his career complicating it.
The clearest piece of that work is a comparative analysis he co-authored with ten other primatologists. They standardised basal cortisol across seven primate species, from cooperatively breeding marmosets and tamarins to large multi-male, multi-female troops of rhesus, baboons and squirrel monkeys, and expressed each species as a ratio of subordinate to dominant cortisol in stable hierarchies. Two variables predicted whether subordinates were more stressed: “subordinates exhibited higher relative cortisol levels when they (1). were subjected to higher rates of stressors, and (2). experienced decreased opportunities for social (including close kin) support” (Abbott et al. 2003, Hormones and Behavior). Rank itself did not predict the cortisol gap. The rate of harassment did, and so did whether you had anyone to go to.
Sapolsky’s own review of the same question in Science reaches the same shape of answer across species and across human societies: what the hierarchy does to you depends on how the hierarchy is run (Sapolsky 2005).
The social side of this is not soft. A large cross-species review in Science put it flatly: “The social environment, both in early life and adulthood, is one of the strongest predictors of morbidity and mortality risk in humans,” and animal experiments show that social interactions “can causally alter animal physiology, disease risk, and life span itself” (Snyder-Mackler et al. 2020). Where you sit among others is not a decoration on top of a life. It gets into the tissue.
So the biology does not say abolish hierarchy. It says two specific things make one harmful: constant exposure to people above you who can act on you, and no one to absorb it with. Hold those two levers. They come back at the end.
The population claim, and the honest state of the fight
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett took the next step and argued at the level of whole countries: that more unequal societies do worse on health and on a long list of social outcomes, and that the mechanism runs through status comparison. Their own causal review concludes that “the body of evidence strongly suggests that income inequality affects population health and wellbeing” (Pickett & Wilkinson 2015, Social Science & Medicine).
The criticism of that claim is serious and we will not soften it. The largest systematic review on the other side went through 98 aggregate and multilevel studies and concluded that “there seems to be little support for the idea that income inequality is a major, generalizable determinant of population health differences within or between rich countries” (Lynch et al. 2004, The Milbank Quarterly). The same authors also note that the strongest evidence, from US states, is itself mixed.
The meta-analysis sitting between them is the most useful number in the field. Pooling nine cohort studies covering 59.5 million people and nineteen cross-sectional studies covering 1.28 million, Kondo and colleagues found a relative risk of 1.08 (95% CI 1.06 to 1.10) for mortality per 0.05 increase in the Gini coefficient. They describe this as “a modest adverse effect of income inequality on health,” report that the association weakens once unmeasured regional characteristics are accounted for, and find support for a threshold: the effect appears above roughly a Gini of 0.3 (Kondo et al. 2009, BMJ).
Then there is the mechanism itself, which is the part that concerns us. Richard Layte and Christopher Whelan tested the status anxiety hypothesis directly on 34,000 people across 31 European countries. They found the weaker version held: people in low-inequality countries reported less status anxiety at every point on the income rank curve. They found no support for the stronger version, which would require inequality to sharpen the effect of your own rank on your own anxiety (Layte & Whelan 2014, European Sociological Review).
A later study followed the same idea into the bloodstream. Using harmonised data on 18,349 people aged 50 to 75 across Britain, Ireland, Portugal and Switzerland, it found mean C-reactive protein highest in Portugal, the country with the highest income inequality of the four, and lowest in Switzerland. Adjusting for lifestyle cut the differences between socio-economic groups by 45 to 52 per cent, but could not account for the variation between countries (Layte et al. 2019, Scientific Reports).
Put the four together and the responsible summary is narrow. The strong claim, that inequality is a master cause of population health, does not survive Lynch. The modest claim, that living under a steeper single ladder is measurably worse for people and shows up in their inflammation, survives Kondo, Layte and Layte. We build on the modest claim, and we would rather say so than quote the version that flatters us.
Why money became the ladder everyone was put on
There is a question underneath all of this that the health literature does not ask. Of all the things a society could rank people by, why did money take the job?
Thorstein Veblen answered it in 1899 and the answer is mechanical rather than moral. In a village, your standing rests on what people know about you over years. In a city it cannot, because most of the people forming an opinion of you will never see your life. “One’s neighbors, mechanically speaking, often are socially not one’s neighbors, or even acquaintances; and still their transient good opinion has a high degree of utility. The only practicable means of impressing one’s pecuniary ability on these unsympathetic observers of one’s everyday life is an unremitting demonstration of ability to pay” (Veblen 1899, The Theory of the Leisure Class, Ch. IV).
Money won because it is legible to strangers. It compresses a whole life into one number that a person who knows nothing about you can read in a second, from your shoes. Nothing else works that fast. A decade of showing up for someone is invisible to a stranger on a train.
And legibility to strangers is exactly what turns many local ladders into one. Frank’s small pond has an exit: you can find the pond where your work is understood. A single universal metric has no exit, because it is the same metric in every room you walk into. That is the arrangement de Botton’s readers recognise, and it was assembled by a printing convenience, not by a decision anyone made.
What a plural ecology of honour would change, and what it would not
The two levers the primate work identified were rate of stressors and access to support. The economics adds a third, the number of ponds. Those three are the whole of what we think is available to design.
More ponds means more places where what you actually do is the thing being judged, by people competent to judge it. That is not a metaphor. It is what a research field, a craft guild, a neighbourhood association and a maintainers’ mailing list already are. Support means the recognition is conferred by peers who stay in relationship with you rather than issued by a distant scorer. And the honour has to stay non-convertible, which is the argument we make in Honor Is Not a Price: the moment standing can be cashed, it re-collapses into the single legible metric that started this, and Veblen’s stranger can read it again.
What we cannot claim is that any of this removes status anxiety. Nothing in the evidence above says a plural recognition ecology has been built and measured, because it has not been. The health studies are about income inequality, not about honour. Frank’s ponds can be cruel; a small field with three gatekeepers is a worse place to be judged than a large one, and we know that from the same literature that gives us the ponds. Envy is not a policy problem and will not be solved by one.
What we do claim is narrower and, we think, defensible. Status anxiety is not a fixed quantity that a society has to absorb. It is sensitive to how many ladders there are, how much you are exposed to the people above you on them, and whether anyone stands with you. Those three things are built, which means they can be built differently.
Make impact, not money, the measure of a life.
Sources
- de Botton (2004), Status Anxiety, Hamish Hamilton / Pantheon — https://www.alaindebotton.com/status/
- Frank (1985), Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status, Oxford University Press — https://global.oup.com/academic/product/choosing-the-right-pond-9780195049459
- Abbott, Keverne, Bercovitch, Shively, Mendoza, Saltzman, Snowdon, Ziegler, Banjevic, Garland & Sapolsky (2003), “Are subordinates always stressed? A comparative analysis of rank differences in cortisol levels among primates”, Hormones and Behavior 43(1), 67–82 — https://doi.org/10.1016/S0018-506X(02)00037-5
- Sapolsky (2005), “The Influence of Social Hierarchy on Primate Health”, Science 308(5722) — https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1106477
- Snyder-Mackler et al. (2020), “Social determinants of health and survival in humans and other animals”, Science 368, eaax9553 — https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aax9553
- Pickett & Wilkinson (2015), “Income inequality and health: a causal review”, Social Science & Medicine 128, 316–326 — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.12.031
- Lynch, Davey Smith, Harper, Hillemeier, Ross, Kaplan & Wolfson (2004), “Is income inequality a determinant of population health? Part 1. A systematic review”, The Milbank Quarterly 82(1), 5–99 — https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0887-378X.2004.00302.x
- Kondo, Sembajwe, Kawachi, van Dam, Subramanian & Yamagata (2009), “Income inequality, mortality, and self rated health: meta-analysis of multilevel studies”, BMJ 339, b4471 — https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2776131/
- Layte & Whelan (2014), “Who Feels Inferior? A Test of the Status Anxiety Hypothesis of Social Inequalities in Health”, European Sociological Review 30(4), 525–535 — https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcu057
- Layte, McCrory, Ní Cheallaigh, Bourke, Kivimäki, Ribeiro, Stringhini & Vineis (2019), “A Comparative Analysis of the Status Anxiety Hypothesis of Socio-economic Inequalities in Health Based on 18,349 individuals in Four Countries and Five Cohort Studies”, Scientific Reports 9, 796 — https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-37440-7
- Veblen (1899), The Theory of the Leisure Class, Ch. IV “Conspicuous Consumption” (public domain) — https://www.gutenberg.org/files/833/833-h/833-h.htm